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SUMMARY
This paper examines how beliefs about own HIV status affect decisions to engage in risky sexual behavior, as mea-
sured by having extramarital sex and/or multiple sex partners. The empirical analysis is based on a panel survey of
males from the 2006 and 2008 rounds of the Malawi Diffusion and Ideational Change Project (MDICP). The paper
develops a behavioral model of the belief-risky behavior relationship and estimates the causal effect of beliefs on
risky behavior using the Arellano and Carrasco (2003) semiparametric panel data estimator, which accommodates
both unobserved heterogeneity and belief endogeneity arising from a possible dependence of current beliefs on
past risky behavior. Results show that downward revisions in the belief assigned to being HIV positive increase
risky behavior and upward revisions decrease it. For example, based on a linear speciﬁcation, a decrease in the
perceived probability of being HIV positive from 10 to 0 percentage points increases the probability of engaging
in risky behavior (extramarital affairs) from 8.3 to 14.1 percentage points. We also develop and implement a
modiﬁed version of the Arellano and Carrasco (2003) estimator to allow for misreporting of risky behavior and
ﬁnd estimates to be robust to a range of plausible misreporting levels. © 2013 The Authors. Journal of Applied
Econometrics published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The AIDS epidemic imposes a large toll on populations in sub-Saharan Africa through high rates of
mortality and morbidity. About two thirds of people infected with HIV worldwide reside in the region,
and several countries have adult prevalence rates above 20% (UNAIDS, 2008). Heterosexual
intercourse is known to be the main mode of transmission in Africa, but relatively little is known about
how the disease and people's awareness of their HIV status inﬂuence sexual behaviors. Understanding
the behavioral link is important to developing effective policy interventions, such as HIV testing
programs or informational campaigns.
This paper studies how people's decisions to engage in risky sexual behaviors relate to their beliefs
about own HIV status. From a theoretical perspective, the effect of beliefs on risky behavior is ambiguous.
People who assign a high likelihood to being HIV-positive may take more risks as they are already
infected. On the other hand, the fear of infecting others (via altruism, social norms or sanctions) might
deter transmissive behaviors. People who assign a low likelihood to own infection may have a greater
incentive to take precautions to avoid infection but may also take more risks because of less concern about
infecting others. Reducing risky behavior of HIV-positive persons generally reduces incidence rates, but
the relationship between risky behavior of HIV-negative persons and incidence rates is less clear.
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To prevent the further spread of HIV, government and nongovernmental organizations have
implemented a variety of public health interventions, including increasing access to testing and
treatment services, informational campaigns, and condom distribution programs. It is hoped that
informing individuals about their own HIV status and about methods of avoiding transmission will
reduce incidence rates, although the quantitative evidence on behavioral responses is scarce. A study
by Thornton (2008), described in Section 2, ﬁnds that individuals in Malawi who received positive
HIV test results modestly increased condom purchases but did not alter sexual behavior over a 2-month
timeframe following test result dissemination. Oster (2012) also shows little response of sexual
behavior to local prevalence rates using Demographic and Health Surveys data for a subset of African
countries. Philipson and Posner (1995) report similar ﬁndings for the USA.
Two ingredients are necessary for a program intervention to effectively reduce HIV incidence. First,
the intervention must alter individuals’ beliefs about their own HIV status, HIV prevalence and/or
about the technology for transmission; and, second, these belief changes must induce changes in
behavior. In the context of rural Malawi, the link between HIV testing and beliefs has been tenuous.
Table I shows the 2004 and 2006 test results given to males in the Malawi Diffusion and Ideational
Change Project (MDICP) sample used in our analysis and their reported belief of being HIV-positive
2 years later (in 2006 and 2008). One would expect those receiving a positive test result to revise their
belief of being positive upward (perhaps to 100%) and those receiving a negative test outcome to revise
their belief downward. However, as seen in the table, the majority of individuals who tested positive in
2004 and 2006 report a zero probability of being positive 2 years later. There are also some individuals
who test negative in 2004 and 2006 and assign a high probability to being positive 2 years later.
The evidence reported in this paper and in Delavande and Kohler (2009) indicate that beliefs are not
completely revised in accordance with test results, although the reasons why are not fully understood.
HIV-positive individuals are typically asymptomatic for many years and may therefore not believe that
they carry the disease, particularly in the earlier years when testing was less prevalent. A high reported
belief of being positive in 2006 despite a negative test result in 2004 could also reﬂect interim risky
behavior. Lastly, the testing protocol required a second test whenever a positive result was obtained
and a third test whenever the ﬁrst and second tests were discordant, which induced a very low
probability of a false positive. Nonetheless, some MDICP respondents expressed skepticism about
the quality of the tests administered in 2004, which was likely exacerbated by an initial delay of one
or more months in providing the test results. Tests administered in 2006 and 2008 used more rapid
testing technology and did have this delay.
This paper focuses on the second ingredient mentioned above and analyzes how beliefs about own
HIV status inﬂuence risky behavior. The effect of participating in HIV testing on risky behavior has
been examined in previous studies, but the belief–behavior relationship has received less attention.
This relationship is independently of interest, because the effects of many policy interventions, such
as HIV testing programs or public awareness programs, are mediated through changes in beliefs.
Table I. HIV test results in 2004 and reported beliefs of own probability of infection 2 years latera
HIV test outcome in 2004 HIV test outcome in 2006
Reported belief category 2 years later Negative Positive Negative Positive
Zero probability 401 8 232 6
Low probability 77 6 144 5
Medium probability 12 2 31 2
High probability 15 4 8 2
aSample of males who got tested and learned the test result.
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Additionally, beliefs can change over time even in the absence of policy interventions, for example, in
response to past risk exposure or to new information about the HIV status of previous sex partners.
Our empirical analysis is based on panel data from the MDICP survey, which contain unique
measures of beliefs about own HIV status that vary substantially across people and over time. The
sample covers rural populations from three different regions in Malawi, where overall HIV prevalence
is approximately 7%. The survey is unusual in that it includes measures of individuals’ reported beliefs
about their own and their spouse's HIV status as well as information on whether they engaged in risky
behaviors. We use data from the 2004, 2006 and 2008 survey waves. We focus on men, who are more
likely than women to report risky behavior. The rate of risky behavior need not be the same for men
and women. First, it is more socially acceptable for men to report having multiple partners and
extramarital affairs than for women. Second, men engage in some practices that are not common for
women, such as having transactional sexual relationships with younger women. Because our analysis
focuses on men, the results may not apply to other demographic groups.
Of key concern in any analysis of the relationship between sexual behavior and beliefs is the
potential for endogeneity arising from a likely dependence of current beliefs on past behavior. Such
a dependence leads to bias for both cross-section and within estimators (in linear models). Other panel
data estimators (e.g. conditional logit) are also inappropriate as they do not allow for feedback from
lagged behavior on current beliefs (a violation of strict exogeneity). For this reason, we estimate our
model using a semiparametric panel data estimator developed by Arellano and Carrasco (2003), which
accommodates feedback from lagged behavior on current beliefs and unobservable heterogeneity. We
also develop a modiﬁed version of the Aarellano Carrasco (2003) estimator that allows for potential
under-reporting of risky behaviors.
Section 2 summarizes related literature. Section 3 presents a simple model of risky behavior that
illustrates that the net effect of changing beliefs on risk-taking is theoretically ambiguous and which
guides the choice of variables in our empirical analysis. Section 4 presents our empirical strategy for
estimating the causal effect of beliefs about own HIV status on risk-taking behaviors. Section 5
describes the empirical results based on the Arellano and Carrasco (2003) estimator and on our
modiﬁed version that allows for misreporting of risky behavior. Section 6 discusses policy
implications.
2. RELATED LITERATURE
The notion that individuals change their behavior in response to communicable diseases is generally
well accepted and there is a theoretical literature that explores the general equilibrium implications
of this type of behavioral response. Philipson (2000), for example, surveys alternative theoretical
frameworks of how behavior responds to disease prevalence. These include models of assortative
matching (HIV-positives matching with HIV-positives and HIV-negatives with HIV-negatives), which
are shown to have a dampening effect on the spread of a disease (Dow and Philipson, 1996); models
that relate prevalence rates and the demand for vaccination; models for the optimal timing of public
health interventions; and models for studying the implications of information acquisition (e.g. testing)
for asymptomatic diseases such as HIV. In another theoretical study, Mechoulan (2004) shows that
without a sufﬁcient fraction of altruistic individuals testing can increase disease incidence.
Thornton (2008) empirically examines the causal impact of receiving HIV test results on risky
behavior. When the 2004 tests were administered, the MDICP project team carried out an experiment
that randomized incentives to pick up the test results. Thornton (2008) analyzes data from this
experiment along with data from a 2-month follow-up survey that gathered information on condom
purchases and risky sexual behavior. Using the randomized incentive as an instrument for picking
up the test results, she ﬁnds that learning a positive test result modestly increased condom purchases
but did not alter sexual behavior. Individuals who tested negative tended to revise their subjective
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beliefs about being HIV-positive downward and those who tested positive did not signiﬁcantly revise
their beliefs.
Although also based on MDICP survey data, our study differs from Thornton's in a number of
ways: (i) a focus on identifying the causal belief–behavior relationship rather than HIV testing–
behavior relationship; (ii) the use of new data gathered in the 2006 and 2008 rounds of the
MDICP sample that contain more detailed measures on beliefs than were available in the 2004
round and that is not conditioned on having picked up the test results in 2004; (iii) the use of
a different modeling framework and estimation methodology; and (iv) the use of different
measures of risky behavior (extramarital sex and multiple sex partners, measured annually).
Boozer and Philipson (2000) analyze the relationship between HIV status, testing and risky
behavior using data from the San Francisco Home Health Study (SFHHS). Our identiﬁcation
strategy is similar to theirs in that we also make use of belief information gathered in two time
periods, where individuals had the opportunity to get tested in the intervening period. In the
SFHHS survey, all individuals who were unaware of their status (around 70%) were tested
immediately after the ﬁrst wave of interviews and learned their status. Boozer and Philipson
use those who already knew their status (the remaining 30%) as a control group and ﬁnd that
decreases in the probability assigned to being HIV-positive increase sexual activity. That is,
individuals who considered themselves highly likely to be infected and discover they are not
increase the number of partners and those who believe themselves to be unlikely to be infected
and discover otherwise reduce their number of partners. Our empirical ﬁndings are similar,
despite the different study population and estimation approach.
Coates et al. (2000) and Gong (2012) analyze data from a Voluntary Counseling and Testing
(VCT) Efﬁcacy Study: a randomized trial that took place in Kenya, Tanzania, and Trinidad in the
mid 1990s. Study participants were randomly assigned to a treatment group that received VCT or
to a control group that received basic health information. Data were gathered on self-reported
sexual behavior. Sexually transmitted infections (STIs) were also diagnosed and treated at ﬁrst
follow-up. Coates et al.’s (2000) analysis ﬁnds that VCT reduced risky behavior, as measured
by self-reported unprotected intercourse. More recently, though, Gong (2012) reanalyzed the data
from the African sites, including the STI outcome data, and found that individuals who originally
believed themselves to be HIV-negative and were surprised by a positive test result were more
likely to contract an STI, while the reverse was true for those who were surprised by a negative
test result. He concludes that informing people of a positive test has the unintended consequences
of increasing risky behavior. Gong argues that biological STI measures are better indicators of
risky behavior than self-report measures, because they are not affected by misreporting. However,
misclassiﬁcation of risky behavior is also possible when biological measures are used, as not all
individuals who engage in risky behavior contract an STI. Comparing Gong's study population to
ours, notable differences are that his sample is younger and contains a higher proportion of single
and urban individuals. His data were also gathered at a time when there were fewer HIV
treatment options, which may affect how individuals respond to testing and to changes in beliefs
about own HIV status.
As we describe in detail later, the MDICP survey measured beliefs about own HIV status using
two different measurement instruments. In the 2004, 2006 and 2008 surveys, individuals were
asked to choose one of four categories: no likelihood, low likelihood, medium likelihood and
high likelihood. In 2006 and 2008, the categorical measure was supplemented with a numerical
measure, which is our main belief measure in this paper. Delavande and Kohler (2009) used
the MDICP data to study the accuracy of individuals’ reported numerical beliefs of being
HIV-positive and provided detailed documentation of the method used in the surveys to elicit
the probabilistic beliefs. They found that the probability assessments on HIV infection gathered
in the 2006 round of the survey were remarkably well calibrated to local community prevalence
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rates. For the 2004 wave of the MDICP data, however, the likelihood of own infection is reported
only in broader categories. Anglewicz and Kohler (2009) point out that individuals in the 2004
wave seem to overestimate the risk of being infected; 10% of husbands and 18% of wives
estimate a medium or high likelihood of current infection, while actual prevalence in 2004 was
6% for men and 9% for women. In reconciling the 2004 evidence with the well-calibrated
probabilistic assessments in the later wave, Delavande and Kohler note problems of interpersonal
comparability of the coarse belief categories and that, even if anchoring techniques are used (such
as vignettes), complications still remain in translating the coarse categories into more precise
assessments. 1 In this paper, we make use of both the coarse belief categories and the ﬁner
measurements gathered in 2006 and 2008, as further described in Section 4.
In a follow-up paper, Delavande and Kohler (2012) use the 2004 and 2006 MDICP data to
assess the impact of learning HIV status on expectations about own HIV status and on sexual
behavior, measured in 2006. Like Thornton (2008), they use the randomized ﬁnancial incentive
as an instrument for learning HIV status (picking up the test result), but their outcome measures
are obtained 2 years after the testing rather than 2months after (as in Thornton's, 2008, study) and
their model additionally controls for possible nonrandom attrition. They ﬁnd that learning an
HIV-positive status is not associated with a statistically signiﬁcant increase in the probability
assigned to being HIV-positive 2 years later. Also, people who received an HIV-negative test
result in 2004 tend to report a higher probability of being infected in 2006. With regard to sexual
behavior, they ﬁnd that learning a positive HIV status in 2004 leads to having fewer partners and
using a condom more often (measured in 2006). HIV-negative individuals who learn their status
were more likely to have a condom at home. Couples in which two people learned a negative
status were more likely to use condoms (typically, for extramarital relations), but couples in
which only one person learned a negative status decreased condom use. We do not analyze
condom use in our study, because its use within marriage is rare and the variable was not
available in 2008.
Delavande and Kohler (2011) use the 2006 and 2008 MDICP data to study the relationship
between subjective beliefs and risky sexual behaviors. They specify a three-equation model of
the probability of being HIV-infected prior to the 2006 test, the decision to get tested in 2006,
and the decision to have multiple partners. The decision to have multiple partners is assumed
to depend on the difference in the subjective expectations of surviving with and without HIV and
on own beliefs about being HIV-positive. The authors ﬁnd that HIV/AIDS-related subjective expectations
play an important role in the multiple-partner decision.
Although some of the questions addressed in the Delavande and Kohler (2011) study are sim-
ilar to those in this paper, the empirical approach is quite different. A key difference is that
Delavande and Kohler (2011) account for belief endogeneity by explicitly modeling how beliefs
are formed within a parametric framework. Our dynamic panel data model approach does not
require specifying how beliefs are formed. Also, they explicitly incorporate belief data about
HIV survival probabilities into their model, whereas our model incorporates these beliefs through
person-speciﬁc unobservables. One similarity is that Delavande and Kohler (2011) use the
estimation strategy ﬁrst proposed in our paper to allow also for the possibility of misreporting
error.
There are some other related papers in the public health literature (see, for example, Higgins
et al. (1991); Ickovics et al. (1994); Wenger et al., 1991, 1992) that ﬁnd little or mixed evidence
of behavioral response to HIV testing.
1 For recent surveys on the use of expectations data in development contexts, see Attanasio (2009) and Delavande et al. (2011).
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3. A MODEL OF RISKY BEHAVIOR CHOICES
As noted in the Introduction, theoretical models are usually ambiguous as to the direction of the
relationship between beliefs about one's own HIV status and risk-taking behaviors. Downward
revisions in beliefs, as may arise from learning a negative test result, should increase the expected
length of life and thereby increase the beneﬁts from risk avoidance. On the other hand, if, as in our
sample, individuals tend to overestimate the probability of becoming HIV-infected from one sexual
encounter with an infected person, then learning that they are HIV-negative despite a past life of risky
behavior may increase their willingness to take risks. 2 This channel is not included in the theoretical
model presented here but is allowed to operate in our empirical analysis, as later described. Altruism
also plays an important role in HIV transmission; people who are altruistic should curtail risky
behaviors after an upward revision in beliefs. Other factors that may also inﬂuence transmissive
behavior are social or legal sanctions imposed on HIV-positive individuals.
To explore the relationship between beliefs of own HIV status and sexual behavior, we next present
a simple two-period model. It assumes that individuals choose their level of risky behavior in the ﬁrst
period and update their beliefs of own HIV status in a Bayesian way. Let eY0∈R denote an individual's
chosen level of risky sexual behavior (which represents activities such as engaging in extramarital sex
or having multiple sex partners). The (perceived) probability of infection is an increasing function of
risky behavior and we denote it by g eY0 ∈ 0; 1½ . In a multi-period context, this belief may also be
updated through time but we take it as predetermined when the risky behavior decision is taken. Other
factors, such as the prevalence rate in the community, modulate the link between sexual behavior and
the likelihood of infection and could also be incorporated into the function g(). We abstract from such
inﬂuences here for ease of presentation, but the empirical analysis includes conditioning variables
intended to hold constant local prevalence rates.
Let B0 denote the individual's prior belief about his own HIV status. Individuals potentially
obtain satisfaction from risky sexual behaviors in the ﬁrst period. We also allow one's perception
on HIV status, B0, to directly affect utility: U eY0; ;B0 . How beliefs affect the marginal utility of
risky behavior can be regarded as a measure of altruism or the degree to which social sanctions
on transmissive behavior by HIV-positive individuals affect the utility of sexual intensity. In the
second period, individuals receive a ‘lump-sum’ utility ﬂow equal to U, but this is reduced by λU
if an individual contracts HIV in the ﬁrst period. λ can be interpreted as the mortality rate for an
HIV-positive individual. The discount factor is β. The belief of being HIV-positive in the second
period (B1) depends on previous period beliefs (B0) plus the probability of having contracted the
disease in the last period:
B1 ¼ B0 þ 1 B0ð Þg eY0  (1)
The individual's problem is
maxeY 0 U eY0;B0
 þ β 1 λB1ð ÞU 
or, equivalently,
maxeY 0 U eY0;B0
 þ β 1 λB0  λ 1 B0ð Þg eY0  U 
2 The probability of infection from a single sexual encounter is thought to be about 0.1% (see Gray et al., 2001).
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The ﬁrst-order condition yields
U1 eY0;B0  βλ 1 B0ð Þg′ eY0 U ¼ 0 (2)
where U1(,) denotes the derivative of U(,) with respect to its ﬁrst argument. This condition implicitly
deﬁnes eY0 as a function of the belief variable B0. Furthermore,
deY0
dB0
¼  U12
eY0;B0 þ βλg′ eY0 U
U11 eY0;B0  βλ 1 B0ð Þg′′ eY0 U
which, given a concave (in eY0 ) utility function, is positive if U12 eY0; ;B0 þ βλg′ eY0 U > 0 and
g′′ eY0  > 0. The latter is reasonable if the probability of infection g eY0 ) is low (take, for instance, g
() to be a logistic or normal cumulative distribution function and consider the low rates of transmission
per sexual act). If an individual's marginal utility from (risky) sexual behavior is insensitive to his or
her perception on HIV status (that is, not altruistic or amenable to social sanctions if HIV-positive),
U12 eY0; ;B0 þ βλg′ eY0 U ¼ βλg′ eY0 U which is positive. As long as one's marginal utility does
not decrease much (relative to βλU), higher prior beliefs are associated with riskier behaviors. A person
who is not altruistic (i.e. U12() = 0) would be expected to increase risky behavior upon learning a
positive test result and to decrease risky behavior upon learning a negative test result. Intuitively, if
one is already infected, sexual behavior poses no further risks but still provides utility.
In a multi-period context, beliefs affect current behavior and respond to past behavior through
updating. The prior belief B0 is based at least in part on previous eY0 choices. As described in the next
section, dependence of beliefs on previous behavior poses estimation challenges, because it leads to a
potential lack of strict exogeneity in a panel data model. Another potential source of endogeneity arises
from unobservable traits that affect both beliefs B0 and behavior eY0.
4. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
As noted, we aim to assess whether and to what extent changes in beliefs about own HIV status affect
risk-taking behaviors. The behavioral model developed in the previous section implies a decision rule
for risky behavior that depends on beliefs about own HIV status (equation (2)). Our empirical decision
rule speciﬁcation introduces additional covariates to allow for important time-varying determinants of
behavior, such as age. (Any linear time trend is also captured into the coefﬁcient on age.) It also con-
trols for time-invariant determinants by incorporating correlated individual random effects (as de-
scribed below). These time-invariant determinants may include religiosity, education, local
prevalence rates (which were roughly constant over the 2006–2008 time period we study), and individ-
ual or region-speciﬁc costs of risky sexual behavior.
We next describe the nonlinear panel data estimation strategy used to control for endogeneity of
beliefs and for (correlated) unobservable heterogeneity. Let eYit denote the actualmeasure of risk-taking
behavior of individual i in period t, which in our data is an indicator for whether the individual engaged
in extramarital sex or an indicator for having had more than one partner over the previous 12months.3
Denote by eYit the reported measure of risk-taking behavior of individual i in period t. Later, we allow
3 A possible alternative measure of risky behavior is reported condom use, but it is not available in the 2008 survey. Previous
work ﬁnds that condom use (though not condom purchase) is relatively inelastic in Malawi. Only 7% of those individuals tested
in 2004, for example, reported using condoms.
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for misreporting in the variable eYit . Bit denotes an individuals’ beliefs at time t about their own HIV
status, measured on a 0–10 scale (with 0 being no likelihood of being HIV-positive and 10 being
positive with certainty).
The empirical speciﬁcation (without misreporting) can be written aseYit ¼ 1 αþ βBit þ γXit þ uit≥0½  (3)
Following Arellano and Carrasco (2003), assume the error term can be decomposed as
uit ¼ f i þ vit
where vit is an idiosyncratic shock and fi is a time-invariant effect that is potentially correlated
with the included covariates. Arellano and Carrasco (2003) approach for modeling the correlated
random effect extends an earlier approach proposed by Chamberlain (1984). It is assumed that uit
is logistically distributed with a location parameter equal to E f i W
t
iÞ
 . No restrictions are imposed
on the shape of the conditional mean function. Wti is a vector that assembles previous and current
values of Bit and Xit and past values of eYit . In our case, Wti will have a discrete support as our
covariates all have discrete supports. Then,
P eYit ¼ 1jWti |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
≡ht Wtið Þ
¼ Λ αþ βBit þ γXit þ E f i WtiÞÞ

where ht Wti
 
can be easily estimated in the data as our covariates have discrete support. Applying an
inverse transformation function, the above expression is equivalent to
Λ1 ht Wti
   α βBit  γXit ¼ E f i WtiÞ
which, ﬁrst-differenced, yields
Λ1 ht Wti
   Λ1 ht1 Wt1i   βΔBit  γΔXit ¼ εit
where
εit ¼ E f i WtiÞ  E f i Wt1i Þ

By the law of iterated expectations:
E εit Wt1i Þ ¼ 0

In the previously described behavioral model, current beliefs about HIV status depend on prior
beliefs and last-period behaviors through updating (equation (1)):
Bit  Bit1 ¼ 1 Bit1ð Þg eYit1 
where eYit1 is a function of fi and vit 1 (equation ((3))). This updating implies a potential corre-
lation between Bit and eYit1, and therefore between Bit, vit 1 and fi. This correlation amounts to a
violation of the usual assumption that covariates be independent of past and future idiosyncratic
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shocks (vit s) invoked in nonlinear panel data settings (i.e. strict exogeneity). An advantage of the
Arellano and Carrasco (2003) estimator is that it only requires that covariates be independent
from current and future idiosyncratic shocks (vit s), but not past ones (i.e. assumes weak
exogeneity). This allows lagged behavior (which is partly determined by past vit s) to affect
current and future beliefs.
The conditional moment restriction can be used to construct a moment-based estimator for the
parameters of interest. In the case of covariates with ﬁnite support, the conditional moments above
are equivalent to the following unconditional moments (see Chamberlain, 1987):
E Zitεit½  ¼ 0
where Zit is a vector of dummy variables, each corresponding to a cell forWt1i . Arellano and Carrasco
suggested constructing a GMM estimator based on the empirical moments:
1
N
∑
N
i¼1
Zit Λ1 ht
^Wti
  	 Λ1 ht1^Wt1i  	 βΔBit  γΔXith i
for t = 2,…,T.
For our weighting matrix we use 1=N∑Ni¼1 ZitZ
′
it , a diagonal matrix that gives more weight to the
cells that have more individuals. To handle cases in which h^ is 0 or 1, we adopt a slight modiﬁcation
of Cox's (1970) small-sample adjustment to the logit transformation:
F1 pð Þ ¼ log pþ 100nð Þ
1
1 pþ 100nð Þ1
 !
In our application, Bit is a numerical measure of the likelihood respondents assigned to being
infected with HIV. In addition, we have access to cruder belief measures that were reported in
categories (‘no likelihood’, ‘low’, ‘medium’ or ‘high likelihood’). To improve efﬁciency, we
include additional moments using this cruder belief variable in the estimation. We add the
following empirical moments to our estimator:
1
N
∑
N
i¼1
lit1 Λ1 ht
^Wti
  	 Λ1 ht1^Wt1i  	 βΔBit  γΔXith i
The vector lit 1 contains dummies for the categorical belief variables in 2006 (no likelihood, low,
medium or high likelihood). Following Arellano and Carrasco (2003), we also assume the normaliza-
tion thatE f ið Þ ¼ 0, which provides two extra moments (one for each year) and allows us to estimate the
intercept α. This restriction does not, however, impose that the average ﬁxed effects are zero within
geographic regions. They may not be the same, for example, due to prevalence rates that vary across
regions.
The resulting GMM estimator is asymptotically normal and its asymptotic variance, taking into
account the estimated regressors (the estimated predicted probabilities), can be obtained by conven-
tional methods for multi-stage estimation problems (see for example, Newey and McFadden, 1994).
To facilitate the interpretation of the estimated parameters, we also report later in the paper the
effects of belief changes from B′ to B′ ′ on behavior:
Δt B′;B′′
 
≡P αþ βB′′ þ γXit þ uit≥0
  P αþ βB′ þ γXit þ uit≥0 
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These are computed as in Arellano and Carrasco (2003), replacing population expectations and
parameters by sample averages and estimates. In particular:
E^f ijWti
 	
¼ Λ1 ht^Wti
  	 α^  β^B′′  γ^Xit
This marginal effect measures the causal impact of beliefs on risky behavior, holding constant the
individual effect (fi) (similar considerations are discussed in Chamberlain (1984, pp. 1272–1274)).
Finally, in our robustness analysis we also consider the possibility that some fraction of individuals
who engage in risky behavior report that they do not. To this end, we adapt ideas developed by
Hausman et al. (1998) to the Arellano and Carrasco (2003) framework. We assume that individuals
always report truthfully when they do not engage in extramarital sex and with a probability α1 lie about
having extramarital sex. Thus, letting Yit denote reported behavior and eYit denote true behavior:
P Yit ¼ 1 eYit ¼ 0Þ ¼ 0 P Yit ¼ 0 eYit ¼ 1Þ ¼ α1
With misreporting, the conditional probability of reporting risky behavior takes the form:
P Yit ¼ 1 WtiÞ ¼ 1 α1ð ÞΛ αþ βBit þ γXit þ E f i WtiÞÞ

which, by the same steps as in the previous derivation leads to the following ﬁrst-difference expression:
Λ1
ht Wti
 
1 α1

 
 Λ1 ht1 W
t1
i
 
1 α1

 
 βΔBit  γΔXit ¼ εit
where
εit ¼ E f i WtiÞ  E f i Wt1i Þ

Using the law of iterated expectations, we again obtain estimation moments for the parameters of
interest. 4 In our robustness analysis, we report coefﬁcient estimates for varying degrees of
misclassiﬁcation.
5. DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.1. Background on the MDICP Survey
The MDICP data were gathered by the Malawi Research Group in rural areas of three districts in the
different administrative regions of the country. 5 As described in the supplementary Web Appendix
(supporting information), Malawi's three administrative regions (North, Center and South) are
signiﬁcantly different in ways that are potentially relevant to our analysis. The MDICP data include
4 One important problem in implementation is that
^ht Wtið Þ
1α1 may be above one in small samples. To guard against this small-sample
problem we use min 1;
^ht Wtið Þ
1α1
n o
.
5 The data collection was funded by the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD), grants R01-
HD044228-01, R01-HD050142, R01-HD37276 and R01-HD/MH-41713-0. The MDICP has also been funded by the Rockefel-
ler Foundation, grant RF-99009#199. Susan Watkins was the PI for the last three grants. Hans-Peter Kohler was the PI for the
ﬁrst two. Detailed information on this survey can be obtained at http://www.malawi.pop.upenn.edu/.
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information gathered from ﬁve rounds of a longitudinal survey (1998, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2008) that
together contain extensive information on socio-economic indicators, household composition, sexual
and partnership histories, and risk assessments of more than 2500 men and women. We primarily
use the 2006 and 2008 survey rounds that include detailed information on beliefs about own HIV status
combined with cruder measures on reported beliefs from the 2004 survey round. Also, for reasons
described previously, we analyze data on men.
Recent studies on the quality of this survey have compared the MDICP sample to other survey
samples from rural Malawi. Anglewicz et al. (2009) compare the MDICP participants in 2004 to the
2004 rural population in the Malawi Demographic Health Survey (DHS). MDICP subjects tend to
be older (see Table 1.1 in that paper), more educated, more likely to be married, more likely to have
known individuals with AIDS but somewhat less knowledgeable about the disease. The authors
conjecture that the difference might be explained by the fact that the Malawi DHS includes rural
townships, whereas the whole MDICP sample resides in villages. The supplementary Web Appendix
provides further information about Malawi and the survey (see also Watkins et al., 2003).
The MDICP survey measured beliefs about own HIV status using two different measurement
instruments. In the 2004, 2006 and 2008 surveys, individuals were asked to choose one of four
categories: no likelihood, low likelihood, medium likelihood and high likelihood. In 2006 and 2008,
the categorical measure was supplemented with a probability measure. One might be concerned that
low-education populations would have difﬁculty in reporting probabilities. For this reason, the MDICP
survey used a novel bean-counting approach to elicit probabilities, in which these were measured on a
0–10 bean scale, where more beans for a particular event correspond to a higher probability assessment
for that event (see the supplementary Web Appendix for details). The measures of subjective beliefs
are valuable, because decision making is affected by how individuals perceive their environment,
whether their perceptions are correct or not. Although we cannot directly validate whether reported
beliefs correspond to actual perceptions, Delavande and Kohler (2009) show that the beliefs correlate
as expected with the variables associated with HIV infection likelihood. As with other empirical
studies using belief data, our analysis assumes that subjective beliefs are accurately reported. If people
do not accurately report subjective beliefs because of fear of stigma, for example, then the estimates
could be biased.
Finally, we note that beliefs are measured at the time of the interview (in 2006 and 2008), whereas
the risky behavior measure pertains to the preceding 12months of each interview. We therefore
assume, in terms of timing, that the beliefs reported at the interview are roughly stable over the
previous 12months. If beliefs were the only regressor, then a violation of this assumption could lead
to potential upward bias in estimation on the coefﬁcient associated with beliefs (which we estimate
to be negative). The direction of the bias is unclear when there are other covariates included.
5.2. Descriptive Analysis
Table II shows the mean and standard deviations for the variables used in our analysis. The total sam-
ple size is 587 men for whom data were collected in both the 2006 and 2008 survey rounds. When
reporting results for extramarital sex, we restrict the sample to the 485 men who were married in both
rounds (possibly to different women). The results for the multiple sex partner outcome include all men,
whether married or not. In 2008, the average age of the sample is 46.
As seen in Table II, in 2006 the average number of beans representing the belief that one's spouse is
HIV-positive is 0.73, in comparison to 1.37 in 2008 (on a scale of 0–10 beans). Figure 1 further shows
the full distribution of reported beliefs in the 2006 and 2008 rounds. Even though individuals were not
informed about their spouse's test result for conﬁdentiality reasons (if their spouse got tested), almost
all of the men who report their spouses got tested also report that their spouses shared the test results
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with them. For example, out of the 580 men in our sample who were married in 2006, 67% report that
their spouse has been tested, and, of those, 97% report that the test result was shared. With regard to
risky behavior, 7.9% in 2006 and 10.9% in 2008 reported having extramarital sex in the last 12months.
For those married in both rounds, the numbers are 4.3% and 10.5%.6
The average number of sex partners was about 1.27 in 2006 and 1.34 in 2008, with monogamous
men reporting on average 1.05 and 1.18, respectively. The average number of partners for younger
men (men under the age of 50) is similar to that for the overall sample. The proportion of men reporting
more than one partner in 2006 was 20% and in 2008 was 21%. For monogamous men the numbers go
down to around 5% in both years. As previously noted, HIV testing was offered in 2006 and 2008.
93.7% of the sample was tested in 2006, in comparison with 81.6% in 2008.
Table III explores the potential determinants of decisions about extramarital sex and having more
than one sexual partner, using a standard logit regression applied to 2006 and 2008 data. The bean
Table II. Descriptive statistics. Sample: males in 2006 and 2008 MDICP samples
Variable Mean SD
Age (in 2008) 45.739 11.639
Muslim 0.239 0.427
Christian 0.717 0.451
No school 0.102 0.303
Primary education only 0.702 0.458
Secondary education 0.184 0.388
Higher education 0.012 0.109
Reside in Balaka 0.318 0.466
Reside in Rumphi 0.372 0.484
Reside in Mchinji 0.310 0.463
Polygamous (2006) 0.173 0.379
Polygamous (2008) 0.168 0.375
Number of children (2006) 5.050 3.032
Number of children (2008) 5.538 2.802
Number of children not reported (2006) 0.046 0.210
Number of children not reported (2008) 0.000 0.000
Metal roof 2006 0.152 0.359
Metal roof 2008 0.201 0.401
Believe that own prob. of HIV is zero in 2006 0.792 0.406
Believe that own prob. of HIV is low in 2006 0.152 0.359
Believe that own prob. of HIV is medium in 2006 0.029 0.168
Believe that own prob. of HIV is high in 2006 0.027 0.163
Believe that own prob. of HIV is zero in 2008 0.551 0.498
Believe that own prob. of HIV is low in 2008 0.341 0.475
Believe that own prob. of HIV is medium in 2008 0.081 0.272
Believe that own prob. of HIV is high in 2008 0.027 0.164
Subjective prob. of being HIV positive, bean count measure (2006) 0.734 1.701
Subjective prob. of being HIV positive, bean count measure (2008) 1.371 1.824
Subjective prob. of spouse being HIV positive, bean count measure (2006) 0.663 1.552
Subjective prob. of spouse being HIV positive, bean count measure (2008) 1.430 1.923
Extramarital sex in last 12months in 2006a 0.079 0.270
Extramarital sex in last 12months in 2008a 0.109 0.312
Number of partners in 2006 1.276 1.444
Number of partners in 2008 1.342 1.821
More than one partner in 2006 0.201 0.401
More than one partner in 2008 0.210 0.407
Took HIV test in 2006 0.937 0.243
Took HIV test in 2008 0.816 0.388
Number of observations 587 —
aThis variable deﬁned conditional on being married.
6 A number of individuals engaging in extramarital sex are only married in one of the rounds and thus are not used in the esti-
mation sample for analyzing the extramarital affairs outcome. However, they are included in the analysis of the other risky be-
havior measure of having multiple partners.
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count measure (reported in columns (1) and (5)) is the regressor used later in our implementation of
Arellano and Carrasco (2003). The disaggregated measures (columns (2), (3), (6) and (7)) are also used
later in the Arellano–Carrasco implementation, in constructing cells used in estimation. People who as-
sign a higher probability of themselves being HIV positive are more likely to report engaging in extra-
marital sex and to report having more than one sexual partner. These correlations do not have a causal
interpretation though, because they do not account for unobserved heterogeneity or for the potential
endogeneity of beliefs. Because the individual effect fi positively affects the likelihood that yi,t 1 is
positive and this, in turn, positively affects beliefs by increasing the probability of infection since
the last period, we would expect beliefs and the residual to be positively associated, introducing an
upward bias in the estimation.
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Figure 1. Belief distribution as measured by numbers of beans (in 2006 and 2008. This ﬁgure is available in
colour online at wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jae.)
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Any simple within estimator, whether linear or nonlinear (e.g. ﬁxed effects logit) would also be
biased, because the assumptions required to justify those estimators preclude feedback from lagged
behavior on current beliefs. Nevertheless, for purposes of comparison, we also report standard ﬁxed-
effect logit estimates for the two risky behavior measures (see Table A1 in the supplementary Web
Appendix). Most of the estimated coefﬁcients associated with the belief variables are positive but
statistically insigniﬁcant, possibly because identiﬁcation comes only from individuals who switch their
behavior status from one period to the other, reducing the effective sample size, or because of
endogeneity bias.
5.3. Estimated Causal Effects
We next report estimates based on model (3) using the preferred Arellano and Carrasco (2003)
methodology, which properly addresses belief endogeneity. The estimation requires that we construct
cells based onWt1i , where the vector includes lagged belief measures and age. In principle, cells could
be constructed separately for all possible values of the discrete covariates; in practice, this
procedure would lead to too many small cells. For this reason, we aggregate some of the cell
categories and, following the recommendation in Arellano and Carrasco, exclude in estimation
very small cells (consisting of one or two individuals). A systematic procedure for cell aggrega-
tion that would allow us to optimally select moments and handle small cells is not available for
this setting and is beyond the scope of this paper. We deﬁne the cells by ﬁrst dividing individuals
into age quintiles and also according to aggregated belief categories. To check sensitivity, we
consider the two alternative aggregations of the bean-counting measure used to represent beliefs:
0,1,2–10 beans and 0,1,2–4,5–10 beans. Although the cells are deﬁned based on aggregate
categories, we use the disaggregated age and belief measures (actual bean counts) in forming
the difference Λ1 ht Wti
   Λ1 ht1 Wt1i   βΔBit  γΔXit.
Panel A of Table IV reports the estimated coefﬁcients obtained for the extramarital sex outcome under
two alternative speciﬁcations. Both speciﬁcations include linear terms in beliefs and age. The second aug-
ments the ﬁrst to include quadratic terms in age and beliefs. A joint test of the statistical signiﬁcance of the
belief variables in the quadratic speciﬁcation shows that they are statistically signiﬁcant at a 5% level. The
estimates indicate that the impact of beliefs on risky behavior is statistically signiﬁcant and that people
reporting higher beliefs of being HIV positive are less likely to engage in extramarital sex.
Panel B of Table IV shows analogous results for the models where the outcome variable is having
multiple sex partners. For both belief aggregations and for the linear model, the coefﬁcient on beliefs is
negative and highly signiﬁcant: people reporting higher beliefs of being HIV-positive are less likely to
have more than one partner. In the quadratic speciﬁcation, higher beliefs lead to less risky behavior.
The coefﬁcients on the linear and quadratic terms are jointly signiﬁcant at a 5% level.
To aid in interpretation of the coefﬁcient estimates, Table V reports the marginal effects of changes
in beliefs (indicated in the table) for both the linear and quadratic speciﬁcations on the probability of
engaging in extramarital sex. The estimates imply that revising beliefs upward decreases risk-taking.
For example, an individual who changes beliefs from a measure of 2 beans (corresponding to 20%,
the average in 2006 for HIV-positive respondents), to a measure of 10 beans (corresponding to
100%) would decrease the probability of having extramarital sex by 5.2 percentage points in 2006
(according to the linear index speciﬁcation and the 0,1,2–10 bean aggregation; see Panel A of Table V).
The estimates also indicate that revising beliefs downward increases risk-taking. Someone who
decreases their belief from a measure of one bean (10%, the average number reported in 2006 by
HIV-negative individuals), to zero increases the probability of extramarital sex by 5.8 percentage
points in 2006 (again for the linear speciﬁcation and 0,1,2–10 aggregation of beans). If the model is
estimated on men who are younger than age 50, the estimated marginal effects are slightly larger.
Á. D. PAULA, G. SHAPIRA AND P. E. TODD958
© 2013 The Authors. Journal of Applied Econometrics published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Appl. Econ. 29: 944–964 (2014)
DOI: 10.1002/jae
For comparison, we also estimate a linear regression of changes in the binary outcomes (ΔYit) on
changes in beliefs (ΔBit) and other regressors (ΔXit) using the cells’ indicators Zi as instruments.
7 We
obtain estimates that are within the range of marginal effects reported in Table V but that constrain
those to be constant regardless of the magnitude in the beliefs change. A linear regression of change
in beliefs on covariates and Zi gives an F-statistic for the exclusion of the instruments (i.e. cells) of
16.51 and an R2 of 0.3678 for the ﬁrst aggregation scheme. The F-statistic and R2 for the second
aggregation scheme are 15.29 and 0.3478, respectively. We obtain comparable belief coefﬁ-
cients in the equations of interest. For the extramarital affairs indicator, the estimated coefﬁ-
cient is  0.05 for the speciﬁcation with the 0,1,2–10 bean aggregation and  0.08 for the
one using the 0,1,2–4,5–10 bean aggregation. Similarly, for the indicator of more than one
partner, we get  0.001 for the speciﬁcation with the 0,1,2–10 bean aggregation and  0.02
with the 0,1,2-4,5–10 bean aggregation.
Many HIV testing programs seek to reduce risk-taking behaviors by providing individuals with
information about their own HIV status. Our results show that the behavioral response with regard
to risk-taking will depend on how beliefs change after receiving test results. The estimates indicate that
7 In keeping with the Arellano–Carrasco estimator, we use 1N ∑
N
i¼1 ZiZ
′
i as weighting matrix, but do not exclude the smallest cells.
Table IV. GMM estimation of the effects of beliefs on the propensity to engage in risky sex
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Extramarital sex
Constant 63.948*** 101.534*** 113.337* 123.43**
(10.239) (19.174) (62.345) (48.045)
Age 1.373*** 2.240*** 2.179 2.395
(0.231) (0.439) (1.924) (1.658)
Bean countb 1.552*** 3.168*** 0.303 0.145
(0.359) (0.760) (4.124) (2.904)
Age squared 0.008 0.008
(0.015) (0.016)
Bean count squaredb 1.361* 1.461**
(0.811) (0.673)
Bean Aggregation used 0,1,2 10 0,1,2 4,5 10 0,1,2 10 0,1,2 4,5 10
Observations 479 476 479 476
Number of cells used in GMM 23 27 23 27
Panel B: More than one sex partner
Constant 4.349 3.925 2.475 11.003
(5.451) (7.786) (16.089) (16.524)
Age 0.135 0.056 0.304 0.084
(0.125) (0.180) (0.632) (0.653)
Bean countb 0.421*** 0.767*** 0.193 0.322
(0.193) (0.302) (1.050) (0.953)
Age squared 0.007 0.007
(0.007) (0.007)
Bean count squaredb 0.311 0.358*
(0.206) (0.196)
Bean aggregation used 0,1,2 10 0,1,2 4,5 10 0,1,2 10 0,1,2 4,5 10
Observations 582 575 582 575
Number of cells used in GMM 27 32 27 32
*p< 10%; **p< 5%; ***p< 1%.
aThe estimates are reported for the two different bean aggregation schemes used in implementing the GMM procedure. The age
categories are aggregated into quintiles.
bMDICP respondents reported their subjective belief about being HIV-infected using a bean-counting measure on a 0–10 scale,
where more beans represented higher likelihood.
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individuals who revise their beliefs downward in response to a negative test would increase risk-taking
and individuals who revise their beliefs upward in response to a positive test would decrease
risk-taking.
Table VI. Estimated coefﬁcients for effects of beliefs on the propensity to engage in extramarital sex, under
varying levels of misreporting (α1). Linear speciﬁcation
α1
Bean aggregationa
0,1,2–10 0,1,2–4,5–10
Age Belief Age Belief
0.00 1.373 1.552 2.240 3.168
0.05 1.381 1.568 2.256 3.199
0.10 1.390 1.584 2.273 3.232
0.20 1.411 1.621 2.313 3.304
0.30 1.437 1.663 2.359 3.387
0.40 1.470 1.713 2.418 3.486
0.50 1.530 1.778 2.531 3.645
0.60 1.591 1.863 2.617 3.773
aThe estimates are reported for the two different bean aggregation schemes used in implementing the GMM estimation procedure.
Age categories are aggregated into quintiles.
Table V. Average marginal effects implied by estimated coefﬁcients in Table VI
Bean changec
Bean aggregation: 0,1,2–10a Bean aggregation: 0,1,2–4,5–10a
Extramarital sex More than 1 partner Extramarital sex More than 1 partner
Panel A: Extramarital sex
From To 2006b 2008b 2006b 2008b 2008b 2008b 2006b 2008b
0 10 0.140 0.310 0.272 0.206 0.180 0.369 0.292 0.220
1 10 0.082 0.207 0.215 0.162 0.079 0.230 0.204 0.152
2 10 0.052 0.133 0.165 0.125 0.050 0.138 0.139 0.103
4 10 0.025 0.047 0.090 0.070 0.030 0.033 0.062 0.051
6 10 0.012 0.011 0.041 0.035 0.018 0.006 0.027 0.031
8 10 0.004 0.003 0.014 0.014 0.010 0.001 0.009 0.014
1 0 0.058 0.103 0.057 0.044 0.101 0.139 0.088 0.068
2 0 0.088 0.177 0.107 0.081 0.130 0.231 0.153 0.117
4 0 0.115 0.263 0.183 0.136 0.149 0.336 0.229 0.169
6 0 0.128 0.299 0.231 0.170 0.162 0.363 0.265 0.189
8 0 0.136 0.307 0.258 0.192 0.170 0.368 0.282 0.205
Panel B: More than one sex partner
From To 2006b 2008b 2006b 2008b 2008b 2008b 2006b 2008b
0 10 0.155 0.346 0.300 0.284 0.142 0.333 0.291 0.242
1 10 0.121 0.294 0.260 0.253 0.098 0.271 0.239 0.202
2 10 0.071 0.176 0.185 0.192 0.062 0.161 0.163 0.142
4 10 0.046 0.076 0.072 0.082 0.039 0.064 0.062 0.055
6 10 0.021 0.013 0.024 0.015 0.020 0.006 0.023 0.007
8 10 0.012 0.003 0.011 0.004 0.012 0.003 0.009 0.003
1 0 0.034 0.052 0.040 0.031 0.044 0.062 0.052 0.041
2 0 0.084 0.170 0.114 0.092 0.080 0.173 0.128 0.101
4 0 0.109 0.270 0.228 0.202 0.102 0.270 0.229 0.187
6 0 0.135 0.333 0.275 0.269 0.122 0.327 0.268 0.235
8 0 0.143 0.343 0.289 0.280 0.130 0.331 0.282 0.239
aThe estimates are reported for the two different bean aggregations used in implementing the GMM procedure. The age
categories are always aggregated into quintiles.
bThe marginal effects are obtained for each individual in the 2006 and 2008 samples and are averaged across individuals.
cMDICP respondents reported their subjective belief about being HIV-infected using a bean-counting measure on a 0–10 scale,
where more beans represented higher likelihood.
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5.4. Robustness
5.4.1. Misreporting
Because risky sexual behavior may be considered a sensitive subject, an obvious concern is
misreporting. In this subsection, we explore the robustness of the previously estimated speciﬁca-
tion to allow for misreporting of risky behavior. To investigate the potential problem of
misreporting, the MDICP team carried out a small set of qualitative interviews with men who
had reported not having extramarital sex during the 1998 round of the survey. These follow-up
interviews were very casual (no questionnaire or clipboard, typically no tape recorder) and were
later transcribed by the principal investigators in the ﬁeld. Slightly over 9% of those who had
originally denied inﬁdelity admitted otherwise in these informal interviews. Even though the
reference period in the 1998 survey was longer and the men may tend to exaggerate in these casual
conversations, this provides some evidence of under-reporting by the respondents during the more
formal interviews.
To gain intuition into why misreporting leads to an attenuation bias in the estimated coefﬁcients,
consider a linear model. Under linearity, E Y XÞ ¼ 1 α1ð Þβð Þ′X
 and the estimated parameters are
attenuated by α1> 0. In our nonlinear case, E eY XÞ ¼ F X; βð Þj and misreporting leads to
E Y XÞ ¼ 1 α1ð ÞF X; βð Þjð (see also Hausman et al., 1998).
To assess the impact of under-reporting on our estimation results, we re-estimated the model for the
extramarital sex measure of risky behavior assuming different levels of misreporting. We use the
modiﬁed version of Arellano and Carrasco's estimator that is described in Section 4. The coefﬁcient
estimates are shown in Table VI for the linear index speciﬁcation (and in Table A2 in the supplemen-
tary Web Appendix for the quadratic speciﬁcations) and for the two alternative belief aggregation
levels and for varying levels of misreporting (α1). The ﬁrst row displays the estimates presented in
our main analysis (i.e. without misreporting) and subsequent rows display the estimates for higher
levels of misreporting (α1). We ﬁnd that higher levels of misreporting lead to higher coefﬁcient
magnitudes.
5.4.2. Additional Regressors
We also investigate how the estimates are affected by the inclusion of additional covariates,
namely reports on past behavior and perceived local HIV prevalence (see Tables A3 and A4
in the supplementary Web Appendix). 8 In the theoretical model of Section 3, past behavior
only inﬂuenced current behavior through belief updating. However, it could conceivably
have an independent effect on current behavior, for example, by affecting search costs for
ﬁnding extramarital partners (which were not incorporated into the theoretical model of
Section 3).
Our previous estimations also assumed that perceived risk of HIV infection is held constant
by inclusion of individual effects, motivated by the fact that actual local prevalence rates were
stable from 2006 to 2008: the p-value for a test of equality across these two years in our
sample is 0.4. Overall, the prevalence has been stable and might have even slightly decreased
(as measured by the 2004 and 2010 DHS), but it is possible that individuals’ beliefs about
prevalence varied over time. For this reason, we also estimated a speciﬁcation that includes
past behavior and reported perceived local prevalence. The variable used to measure perceived
local prevalence rate is the respondents’ answer to the following question: ‘If we took a group
of 10 people from this area—just normal people who you found working in the ﬁelds or in
homes—how many of them do you think would now have HIV/AIDS?’ We notice that the
average perceived prevalence is substantially above the prevalence in our sample, raising
some concerns about this variable. The inclusion of this variable complicates the estimation
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procedure some, because the cells used in the estimation now need to be constructed using
these additional covariates. We base the new cells on quartiles of perceived prevalence, but
the average number of individuals per cell still drops from 21 to less than 10 in the
extramarital sex regressions, once prevalence is included for example. The estimated effect
of beliefs on risky behavior is still negative once prevalence is added and the coefﬁcient is
highly signiﬁcant in the linear speciﬁcation and jointly signiﬁcant in the quadratic
speciﬁcation.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines how beliefs about own HIV status affect decisions to engage in risky
behavior, as measured by extramarital sex and having multiple sexual partners. We use a unique
panel survey from Malawi that includes detailed longitudinal measures of subjective beliefs and
behaviors. The men in our sample were given the opportunity to get tested for HIV in 2004,
2006 and 2008 and most availed themselves of the opportunity, often multiple times. Reported
beliefs about the probability of being HIV-positive vary substantially, both geographically and
over the time period covered by the data collection. Changes in reported beliefs do not always
accord with test results.
Simple cross-sectional correlations suggest that individuals who believe they have a higher
likelihood of being HIV-positive engage in riskier behaviors. These correlations do not have a
causal interpretation though, because of unobserved heterogeneity and because one would
expect beliefs to be updated to reﬂect additional risk posed by lagged behaviors. In a panel
data setting, the correlation between current beliefs and lagged behaviors leads to a violation
of conventional assumptions that regressors in all periods be independent of error terms (strict
exogeneity). To take into account the endogeneity of the belief variable as well as individual
unobserved heterogeneity, we use a semiparametric panel data estimator developed by
Arellano and Carrasco (2003). The estimates indicate that downward revisions in beliefs lead
to a higher propensity to engage in risky behaviors and that upward revisions in beliefs lead
to a lower propensity. We also modiﬁed the Arellano and Carrasco (2003) estimator to incor-
porate reporting error, along the lines of Hausman et al. (1998). Reporting error attenuates the
empirical estimates, but the estimates are robust over a range of plausible reporting error
levels.
Our ﬁndings have important policy implications. They indicate that credibly informing
people that they are HIV-negative, for example, through testing campaigns, can increase risky
behavior. Also, in contexts where people overestimate their risk of being HIV-positive, pro-
viding more accurate information can lead them to be more risky. On the other hand,
informing people about their HIV-positive status reduces risky behavior. The results imply
that policy interventions that aim to inform people about HIV status will be more effective
in reducing risky behavior when selectively targeted at people considered to be at higher risk
of infection.
Lastly, our analysis does not examine how beliefs about own HIV status are formed and to
what extent different types of policy interventions inﬂuence beliefs. The fact that beliefs do not
align closely with HIV test results suggests a need for further study of the process underlying
belief formation.
8 Another potentially relevant covariate is the belief about spousal HIV status. This variable is, however, highly correlated with
belief about own HIV status: among the respondents in our sample, 91% in 2006 and 78% in 2008 report the same likelihood for
own and spouse infection and the average difference is about 0.06 beans on the 0–10 scale used to measure subjective beliefs.
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